Airlifted microreactor for military power & Mars rover gets GPS-like navigation - News (Feb 22, 2026)

We’ll start with that striking logistics milestone from the U.S. Department of Defense. In a mission tied to the Janus Program—called Operation Windlord—the Pentagon airlifted a complete 5‑megawatt microreactor package from California to Utah using C‑17 Globemaster III aircraft. The reactor, a Ward250 design, was shipped unfueled and broken into eight modules, loaded in standard containers or on skids. The message from defense officials is straightforward: they want reliable power that can be moved quickly, assembled, and run in places where long fuel convoys are risky or impractical. What makes this notable isn’t that nuclear components have never been flown before—it’s the claim that this was done through a repeatable, “commercial-first” logistics chain meant for real operations, not a one-off experiment. The reactor uses a high-temperature gas-cooled approach with TRISO fuel and HALEU enrichment, and the plan is for it to begin operating later this year, after assembly and fueling.

From nuclear power to another kind of autonomy—this time on Mars. NASA has upgraded the Perseverance rover with software that effectively gives it a GPS-like ability to figure out where it is without waiting for Earth. Mars, of course, doesn’t have navigation satellites. So rovers usually combine wheel tracking, camera images, and help from teams on Earth to confirm position. The problem is that tiny errors build up, and after long drives Perseverance could end up uncertain by more than a hundred feet—enough to force it to pause near risky terrain until engineers could verify it was safe. The new upgrade, called Mars Global Localization, lets the rover match its own panoramic images to onboard orbital maps and compute its position in about two minutes. NASA says it can get accuracy down to roughly 10 inches. That translates into more driving per Martian day—and more science—because the bottleneck increasingly wasn’t steering around obstacles, but simply knowing exactly where the rover was.

Now to public health, with a development that could change what HIV prevention looks like for many people—especially where stigma and daily routines get in the way of medication. Zimbabwe has started offering lenacapavir, a long-acting HIV prevention injection given just twice a year. The rollout launched on the outskirts of Harare, and Zimbabwe is among the early countries introducing it, alongside neighbors like Zambia and Eswatini. Clinical studies have suggested near-total protection when used as prescribed, and officials in Zimbabwe are framing the injection as a tool that fits “real life.” For many, the appeal is privacy and convenience. A 27-year-old sex worker, Constance Mukoloka, described how daily PrEP pills can be a visible trigger for stigma—clients may see a pill bottle and assume it’s HIV treatment, or react with suspicion. A twice-yearly injection removes that daily reminder, and the risk of being “found out.” The program is donor-supported and part of a broader rollout across 10 African countries backed by PEPFAR and the Global Fund. In Zimbabwe, it’s being provided free to key populations, including sex workers, adolescent girls and young women, gay men, and pregnant and breastfeeding women. There are still hard constraints: Zimbabwe expects about 46,000 people at 24 sites to benefit early on, and expansion depends on additional donor doses in a country with limited capacity to fund mass access. Advocates are also warning that high costs and fragile, aid-dependent health systems—especially amid cuts to U.S. foreign aid—could blunt the impact, even with Gilead’s pledge to sell at no profit. And clinicians emphasize this is an addition, not a replacement: condoms and other prevention options still matter.

Staying with medicine, Stanford researchers have published work in Science that points toward a different kind of vaccine strategy—one aimed at broader protection, rather than a single specific bug. In mouse experiments, the team created a vaccine approach that generated protection against multiple threats: respiratory viruses, bacteria, and even allergens. The idea centers on better using the immune system’s two layers. Traditional vaccines mostly train adaptive immunity—highly effective, but usually narrow. Stanford’s work explores how adaptive responses might “teach” innate immunity to stay switched on longer, extending broader, front-line protection. In their experiments, that innate protection lasted up to six months. The researchers are now seeking funding for human clinical trials, and they estimate a usable product—possibly an intranasal spray or aerosol—could be three to seven years away if development proceeds. They’re also careful to say this wouldn’t replace targeted vaccines, especially during a pandemic, but could offer wider seasonal coverage when specific shots aren’t available or when multiple respiratory threats are circulating at once.

Turning to the global economy, the trade story in Washington is moving fast—and getting more complex. President Donald Trump says he will impose a 15% global tariff on imports into the United States, stepping up from a replacement 10% levy he announced just a day earlier. This follows a Supreme Court decision, 6–3, that struck down his prior sweeping tariffs that had been imposed under the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act. The new plan leans on Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act, a seldom-used statute that allows a tariff to stay in place for about five months unless Congress approves an extension. Two big unanswered questions are timing—whether the 15% starts on the same schedule as the previously announced 10%—and money. The U.S. has reportedly collected at least 130 billion dollars in tariffs under the earlier authority, and the ruling may open the door for refund claims. Business groups, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, want repayment handled quickly, arguing that small importers can’t afford years of legal limbo. The new tariff approach also muddies existing arrangements. A White House official indicated that countries with prior deals could still face the new global rate rather than negotiated rates, though some sector-specific deals were said not to be affected. Meanwhile, exemptions under the Section 122 plan reportedly include critical minerals, certain metals, and pharmaceuticals—while separate tariffs on items like steel, aluminum, lumber, and auto parts continue under other laws.

And that trade pressure is showing up in Europe’s numbers. Germany’s Federal Statistical Office says China has overtaken the United States as Germany’s top trading partner. Total trade between Germany and China reached about 251 billion euros in 2025, up a bit from the year before. Trade with the U.S. came in lower, about 240 billion euros, and was down around 5%—with Trump’s tariff approach cited as a possible factor. This lands right as Germany’s new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, prepares for his first trip to Beijing since taking office. His itinerary includes meetings with top Chinese leaders, plus visits with major industrial players—an illustration of how entwined German manufacturing remains with China. The EU has tried to cool what it sees as overheating Chinese output—think electric vehicles and potentially steel—but Germany’s own carmakers have deep exposure in the Chinese market, which complicates Berlin’s room to maneuver.

Elsewhere in the “global south,” Brazil and India have signed a new, non-binding memorandum of understanding to cooperate on rare earths and other critical minerals. The agreement outlines collaboration on investment, exploration, mining, and even the use of AI in applications connected to the sector. Brazil holds the world’s second-largest rare earth reserves—materials essential for smartphones, electric vehicles, solar panels, and jet engines. Both sides are presenting this as part of a wider push to diversify partnerships and reduce dependence on any single major power. The MoU also comes bundled with broader cooperation plans spanning entrepreneurship, health, research, and education—signaling a relationship that’s aiming to be deeper than a single supply-chain headline.

Now to security and diplomacy, where tensions in the Middle East are rising sharply. Officials and diplomats in the Gulf and Europe are describing a rapid slide toward possible military conflict between Iran and the United States as prospects for a diplomatic solution over Tehran’s nuclear program fade. The reporting points to one of the largest U.S. military buildups in the region since the 2003 Iraq invasion, and notes that the military posture is increasingly overshadowing diplomacy. Israel, according to sources familiar with planning, is preparing for potential joint military action with the U.S., though there’s no indication a final decision has been made. A separate Reuters analysis adds a political layer: it says Trump has ordered preparations for a potential multiweek air campaign against Iran, even as some advisers urge him to focus on economic concerns ahead of this year’s midterm elections. Polling referenced in that analysis suggests cost-of-living pressures outrank foreign policy for many voters—raising the stakes if escalation accelerates.

Finally, a major Ukraine debate is resurfacing in the U.K. Former Prime Minister Boris Johnson says Britain and European allies should deploy noncombat troops to Ukraine now—before any ceasefire—arguing it would signal resolve to Vladimir Putin and reduce Moscow’s leverage. Johnson’s suggestion would be a significant shift from the current public position. The U.K. Ministry of Defence reiterated that planning is focused on a deployment only after hostilities end, as part of a broader “coalition of the willing” concept meant to help police and secure a ceasefire. The escalation risk is real: Putin has previously called foreign troops in Ukraine “legitimate targets.” Johnson’s counterargument is that an independent Ukraine should decide who enters its territory. With the fourth anniversary of the full-scale invasion approaching, the wider question—how to deter Russia without widening the war—remains the central dilemma.